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1. Boycotts in International Relations.
By a boycott we mean the refusal by persons to deal with one or
more other persons. The purpose of the boycott is generally
to punish, or induce abandonment of a course of action, by economic
pressure. Likewise, an international boycott refers to the
f refusal of citizens of a state to trade, or enter into other
economic relations with the citizens of another state, in order to
manifest resentment or bring pressure. A boycott is to be
distinguished from measures of economic retortion such as reprisals,
sanctions, embargoes or blockades, which are initiated by a
government to bring pressure upon a state guilty of unfriendly,
reprehensible or illegal behaviour. Boycotts, however, merge into
such official procedures if they are encouraged or organized by
government.
(^  Historically, one of the most famous boycotts ever to have been
imposed was the Continental Blockade which was set up by Napoleon
in the Berlin Decree of 21 November 1806. As the British Isles
were declared under blockade, all commerce and correspondence with
them was forbidden, and all British property or goods on the
Continent was declared subject to seizure. No vessel could enter
any port if it had touched at a British port first.
The Continental Blockade brought forth a model example of commercial
ingenuity when it came to finding ways and means to bypass the
detrimental consequences of Napoleon's Edict. In particular,
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Holstein became a great region for the deposit of British goods,
whence they were smuggled across the border at a cost of not more
than 40 per cent. bribery was rife, for French agents readily sold
certificates stating a false origin for the goods. This then
allowed British goods to find their way through Saxony, Westphalia,
Austria, Russia, etc. Letters arrived from England, sometimes even
by way of Constantinople, but however devious the route, the
connections were kept open. France was also not successful in
boycotting British imports and in spite of earlier political tensions,
commerce and trade established itself between Britain and the USA.
Great Britain had gained in economic strength when, after some years,
the Napoleonic Blockade was brought to an end.
During both World Wars several trade boycotts were initiated from
time to time, without, however, bringing about the desired result.
In the case of Nazi Germany, armament production peaked in the second
quarter of 1944. It was not the cutting-off of Germany's trade
lines, but the incursion of troops which ultimately led to her
surrender.
The most astonishing example of survival potential under sanctions
is Rhodesia. After her Unilateral Declaration of independence,
Rhodesia's real GDP rose at an average annual rate of 5,3 per cent
for ten years. Moreover, the indices of mineral and manufacturing
production doubled between the years 1965 and 1977.
With the escalation of the war, this favourable development has now
reversed.
2. Boycotts and South Africa.
As far as South Africa is concerned, there has been a notable tendency
Mfor an increase in the calls for an economic boycott. Some years
ago it was only a number of anti-apartheid groups and some United
Nations agencies which actively campaigned for a boycott against
South Africa. More recently, however, several churches, church
associations, trade union bodies and some Western Governments have
also either demanded, or intimated, the possibility of a demand
for sanctions. An arms embargo has already been effective for a
number of years, but it could now be extended to a general oil
embargo. Andrev/ Young,. Ambassador of the United States to the
r United Nations., proposed that economic sanctions be used as a
political lever against South Africa. To this effect, he is
reported to have suggested that taxes paid by subsidiaries of US
multinational corporations should not in future serve as credits
against *JS income taxes, which are payable by the head offices of
multinational companies. Young is also on record as having demanded
that American banking institutions should be prevented from financing
trade between the US and South Africa.
An articulate demand for an investment boycott was made last year in
(' . a joint statement issued by Chief Gatsha Buthelesi and Dr. C.F. Beyers
Naude.
In a preamble, the newspaper Pro Veritate recalls that "the Investment
Debate is widely known in Europe and the USA. Great pressures have
been brought to bear upon investors supporting Companies working in
South Africa, either to withdraw altogether, or to lobby for increased
wages and improved conditions", but "it is immoral for investors to
grow fat on profits that belong to Black workers". The Buthelezi-
Naude statement then reads as follows: "If the Homelands exist to
make labour available to maintain the cash economy and standard of
living of the elite (Black-White or both) and to establish an
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. economic buffer zone of homeland economies to protect the central
economy and provide benefits for the favoured few, we can come to
only one conclusion. Foreign investment in the central economy is
devoid of'all morality." Only a "radical redistribution of wealth,
land and political power" can make foreign investments acceptable.
(Pro Veritate, March 1976).
It is not the purpose of this paper to assess the validity of the
theologians' reasoning. Suffice it to say that social and economic
devastation is a most unlikely scenario from which South Africa will
(„..' . emerge as a peaceful multi-racial society. In my opinion it is
rapid economic growth, and NOT the enforced abandonment of
prosperous international economic links, which is best suited
effectively to further the case of the South African Black.
Be this as it may, let us look now at the consequences which a
hypothetical economic boycott would have for South Africa.
3. The Costs of an Economic Boycott.
It is obvious that an economic boycott is costly, both for the
/• countries actively imposing the boycott, and for those which are
being boycotted. According to calculations submitted by the British
Association of Industries, it has been suggested that a boycott
against South Africa would increase Britain's unemployment by 70 OOO
people. With an export volume exceeding E600 million, one of
Britain's most prosperous overseas markets would have to be sacrificed,
Looking at South Africa, an economic boycott is also costly: both
for the financing of her investments and the marketing of her
products, the country has always been, and still is, highly dependent
on the rest of the world. Indeed, more than one-third of South
Africa's national income is exchanged internationally.
* . • - 5 -
The fact that South Africa's economy is closely interwoven with
the rest of the world produces both strengths and weaknesses.
There is an element of strength in that foreign nations can ill
afford to lose their South African assets, which at the end of 1975
were valued at R16 450 millions/ leading to interest and dividend
payments exceeding R700 million per year. South Africa's high
foreign liabilities have come about, by the way, not only as a
result of net capital imports, but also through the retention of
profits by foreign multinational corporations. For many years, the
f profitability of foreign companies was very high, and as a result,
the rate of profit retention correspondingly large. (Tables 1 - 4 )
Assume, however, that the multinational companies of a particular
foreign nation are forced by law to withdraw their investments from
South Africa, In this case, the companies concerned would have to
sell their assets. But this, and the repatriation of capital,
could presumably only be done at the expense of a considerable
discount. Moreover, it is uncertain whether any buyers could be
found, as the market for the assets of multinational corporations
f would presumably not be very strong. Also, it can hardly be
expected that the South African government would permit the physical
dismantling and repatriation of plant and equipment, and failing
this, the withdrawal of investments would be tantamount, in its
result, to a straight-forward expropriation. On the other hand, it
must also be noted that South Africa's strong international trade
links constitute a source of weakness. This is so because domestic
and foreign capital may turn out to be bad substitutes, particularly
if foreign capital is associated with the influx of foreign
entrepreneurs, foreign knowledge, technology, trade links and the
like.
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We have noted that there would be a considerable resistance by
multinational corporations against the withdrawal of capital already
invested in South Africa. But what about future capital inflows?
To be sure, the South African government has ways and means of
making it unattractive for foreign investors, already resident in
South Africa, to withdraw. Little can be done, however, to
encourage overseas investors to put their money into South Africa
under present circumstances.
So as to quantify the disadvantages of a decline in foreign invest-
ments/ a 52 pole input-output model was designed, capable of assessing
the consequences on the South African economy, of a hypothetical
investment and export boycott. (The adaptation of the input-output
analysis for this question was successfully undertaken by Mr. Yehuda
Uliel/ Lecturer in the Department of Economics at the University cf
the Witwatersrand). So as to make the assumptions easily understood,
it was assumed that at firs^ t 20, and then 50 per cent of the long-
term foreign capital investments in the year 1976 would not have
taken place. The results are shown in Tables 5 and 6.
In 1976, the long-term capital inflow was R995 million. A 20 per
cent investment boycott would'consequently have reduced the capital
inflow by roughly R200 million, whilst a 50 per cent boycott would
have decreased it by about R500 million. The Gross Domestic
Product, which in 1976 was measured as R29 000 million, would have
dropped by 0,5 per cent in the first case, and by 1,5 per cent in the
second case. With a 20 per cent investment boycottjunemployment
would have risen by about 37 000 persons, 30 per cent of whom would
have been VThite and 70 per cent Non-White. Hence, in terms of the
number of work places lost, Non-Whites would have been hit harder
than Whites. The opposite is true for the level of personal incomes:
* . _ "7 _
because of their higher average earnings, 65 per cent of the income
loss would have been borne by Whites, and 35 per cent by Non-Whites.
In respect of a 50 per cent investment boycott, these data would
have been correspondingly higher.
There is little doubt that even a 1OO per cent investment boycott
would not have dealt South Africa a death blow. To be sure, the
unemployment rate would have increased drastically. Personal
incomes would have dropped, and the confidence in the future of
South Africa's economy would have suffered s'evere damage. But there
is no doubt that the country would have embarked on suitable remedial
measures. Local investment incentives would have been stepped up,
and a higher premium would have been placed on entrepreneurial
activity. I would, therefore, maintain that in all likelihood, a
total investment boycott in 1976 would not have decreased South
Africa's GDP by more than 5 per cent, and that the additional
. unemployment would not have exceeded 40 OOO in the case of Whites,
and 80 000 in the case of Non-Whites.
s-' In contrast to an investment boycott, a trade boycott would be
considerably more expensive, . In 1976,a 50 per cent trade boycott
would have reduced South Africa's exports by R4 280 million, and
this would have meant a deterioration in the balance of payments of
R3 746 million. More than 1,1 million people would have become
unemployed, and the very poorest would have been hardest hit, i.e.
employees in agriculture and mining. (See Tables 7 and 8).
It would seem unlikely, however, that South Africa's exports can be
successfully boycotted. If a foreign vessel travelling the Indian
Ocean falls into distress. South Africa will render assistance and
repair services. This produces an export income which, by its very
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nature, can hardly be subject to a boycott. Similar considerations
are valid for the sale of gold and diamonds. These goods are
easily transportable and foreign countries could hardly succeed in
boycotting them. Strategically, Western powers could hardly do
without South African chrome/ uranium and platinum. ' Internally,
however, there is little doubt that South Africa would react to
international economic boycotts with a stepped-up programme of
import substitution. It is of course true, that the costs of
transfering former export capacities to local market production
cannot be evaluated with certainty. It must also be borne in mind,
that when import substitution remains incomplete, certain costs
will have to be borne by the consumer. (At present, South Africa
imports Swiss cheese and exports cheddar. Surely, a break-down of
this exchange would cause hardship to connoisseurs I). In other
areas, such as computer spare parts, import substitution may even
be exceedingly difficult.
Useful quantitative information about the import substitution
potential of the South African economy is contained in a research
report, published in June 1977, and issued by the Afrikaanse Handels-
instituut, the South African Federated Chamber of Industries and
the Steel and Engineering Industries Federation of South Africa.
This comprehensive study came to the conclusion that the potential
for import displacement (where capacity already exists in the South
African economy to produce goods) is presently approximately
"R610 million, whilst the potential for import replacement (where
additional and new capacity would first have to be developed over
the next 3 or 4 years) is R473 million. The report also states
that in terms of 1975 imports, at least 10,9 per cent, and at most
17,4 per cent, could be replaced by 1980, whilst up to 18% of
imports could be displaced.
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It would seem that at present. South Africa holds open the options
of both export promotion and import substitution. Following the
Reynders Commission Report some years ago, the country has embarked
on a successful export drive, and this has recently contributed to
many small and medium South African firms successfully establishing
themselves on export markets. At the same time, the country seems
to have kept open the "back-door" of import substitution, as is
evidenced by the following measures: the imposition of a 15 per
cent import surcharge earlier this year; the preference given to
local tenders.; the refusal of import permits when local suppliers
are available, and other measures designed to prevent foreign
countries from using dumping practices on South African markets.
In conclusion, it would seem that South Africa does not at present
rely entirely on the maintenance of free trade: her efforts to promote
import substitution policies have been too great.
It is of course difficult to assess the psychological and strategical
consequences of an economic boycott. If, for a moment, we look at
the psychological consequences, it can be stated that the rate of
emigration is likely to increase. Until recently, the growth and
the size of the White population were significantly increased by
South Africa's ability to attract large numbers of immigrants. This
has now changed, and whilst during 1976, White net immigration still
exceeded 30 00O persons, 105 net emigrants were counted during the
first five, months of 1977. The Angolan War, the Soweto Riots and
the deterioration in economic and political confidence, can be
considered the main factors which have caused this reversal.
Unfortunately, it is mostly the best 'human capital stock' that
leaves the country, i.e. highly trained specialists such as doctors,
nurses, professional people, etc. More often than not, it is
young rather than old people who opt for emigration.
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Assume, however, that South-Africa can overcome the psychological
impact of a trade boycott. It is also assumed that strategically,
possible military aggression can be successfully faced. In this
event, an 'exuberant phase' of import substitution may come about.
Albert 0. Hirschroann, in an important article entitled "The Political
Economy of Import-Substitution Industrialization in Latin America",
claims that, without doubt, wars and depressions have historically
been most important in bringing industries to countries on the
'periphery' which until then had only been semi-industrialized. The
'easy phase' of import substitution is likely to last as long as the
manufacturing process is still based on imported materials and machinery,
while the importation of the article is firmly and effectively shut
out by controls. Under th^se conditions, the experience of the
newly established firm is likely to be most gratifying. This gives
rise to an often noted exuberance and boom atmosphere, during which
demand is easily overestimated. As a result, the new industry is
likely to find itself saddled with excess capacity as soon as it
reaches its first stage of maturity.
s- The problem with this kind of protected development is that by
virtue of the all-round protection, the very nature of industrial
operations - their precision, ths need for exact timing, punctuality,
reliability, predictability and all-round rationality - is likely
to suffer. Thus, the honeymoon phase of import substitution will
suddenly be over, and even if international markets were again
opened, it would still remain unlikely that the new industries would
be able to compete internationally. Their cost structure would be
too high. Thus, with the increase in unit costs and an exhaustion
of easy import substitution opportunities, the import substituting
process is likely to grind to a halt, and the economy is then left
with a number of high-cost industrial establishments. Development
economists have therefore concluded - (and this has been sub-".
stantiated by reference to known economic history), that an
alternation between market opening and market closure, or an
alternation between liberalism and trade restriction, is probably
the best policy mix for the growth maximization of an economy. In
the case of Germany, this has worked successfully during and after
the Second World War, and in the case of South Africa, much industrial
advance came about through similar experiences. Unfortunately,
however, in respect of the possible imposition of a boycott, there
is the fear that the forces working towards its early abolition will
v not be sufficiently strong to overcome its early reversal.
4. The Justification for an Economic Boycott
From the vantage point of an overseas anti-apartheid group, an
economic boycott would appear to be the most effective medium to
bring about change in South Africa. One is then concerned only with
the overthrow of the system, but little attention is given to the
post-revolutionary state. Polarization between the races is then
the obvious instrument to use to attain the desired result.
(~ The problem with this approach is that the people who make the
recommendations are not the ones who suffer the consequences that
they wish to bring about. Consider, for example, the situation of
a Black mother with three or four children, who struggles to bring
up her family on a meagre income. We have seen that with an
economic boycott, the chances of her husband becoming unemployed
are greatly enhanced. Moreover, the year 1977 has so far been a
bad year from the point of view of job destruction: it is
estimated that on average about 1000 persons have lost their jobs'
during each working day of 1977. We have also noted that the rate
of unemployment would increase somewhat with an investment boycott,
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and that it would rise steeply if an overall trade boycott were
to be imposed. VJhilst in the short and medium term, some
palliative measures such as import substitution policies might
remedy the situation, this is unlikely to be of much benefit in
the long-run when import substitution is likely to become less
effective.
What, then, is the optimal strategy against the threat of the
imposition of a possible economic boycott? There are, of course,
many answers to this question, such, as the restructuring of Black
education, Black land tenure rights in urban areas, the electrific-
ation of Soweto, etc. As a Business Economist, however, I would
like to confine myself to a reference to the continuation of work
reservation in this country.
My reference is to a court case, reported by Alan de Kock in the
February.1977 issue of the South. African Law Journal, referring to
the question of job reservation by agreement. In the case of S v.
Universal Iron & Steel Foundries (Pty) Ltd. (1971) it was held
that an industrial council agreement which had the effect of
s prohibiting the employment of Bantu workers, inter alia, in
certain types of work was not invalid. The appellants had relied
upon the proviso to s 24(2) of the Industrial Conciliation Act No. 28
of 1956, which stipulates that no differentiation or discrimination
on the basis of race or colour may be made in an industrial council
agreement. The agreement in question provided that:
"No employee shall be employed on work qualified in this
Agreement at rates A, AA, AB, B, C or D unless he is eligible
for membership of any Trade Union Parties to this Agreement."
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In terras of s 48(3)a of the Act, the Minister declared the provisions
of the agreement to be binding upon Bantu employed in the industry -
with the exception, inter alia, of clause 24 of Part I of the
agreement, i.e., the closed-shop clause.
It was held against the appellant that he had employed three Bantu
workers in the wage groups A, AB and AA. The appellant argued that
clause 24(2) conflicted with the prohibition, contained in the Act,
that there shall be no discrimination on the grounds of race or
colour. It was also argued that clause 77 made provision for job
reservation and that no further procedure was needed in this regard.
The court rejected this, first, because the prohibition against
discrimination in s 24 (2) of the Act applied only to employees as
defined, and this definition excluded Bantu; and secondly, because
the two clauses s 24 12) and s 77 were to be read together. It is
clear therefore that both s 24(2) and s 77 serve to maintain the
position of the White skilled labour force from being undermined by
semi-skilled and unskilled workers. In cases where, because of
labour scarcities, the 'rate-for-the-*job system1 ceased to give
protection to Whites, the direct support of s. 77 therefore came in
as a supplementary measure.
I have made reference to this somewhat elaborate legal machinery to
give but one of the many cases where the iThite's prerogatives are
firmly entrenched in South African law. To be sure, job discrimination
will eventually come to an end only through a change in attitude, not
solely by new laws. But we should learn from the experience of the
United States that new laws relating to fair employment practices
are the cornerstone of the elimination of discrimination. The
necessary change in attitude is the second step.
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The example discussed is only one of the many serious acts of
discrimination presently found on the South African labour market,
Until these and other discriminatory measures are removed, the
danger of an economic boycott cannot be set aside.
c
Table 1 South African Foreign Liabilities, 1956 to 1975,
all Values in Rand Million
Year
1956
1960
1965
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
Foreign
liahUltiea ,
2767
3121
4005
6017
7133
8255
10380
12757
16450
Foreign
Assets
826
922
1385
2400
2486
3072
3397
3814
4776
Net
indebtedness
194]
2199
2620
3617
4697
5183
6983
8943
11674
Net indebtedness
as per cent of
GDP
47,3 X
43,7 X
33,4 X
29,9 %
34,9 %
34,4 X
38,0 X
41,0 X
~ 47,3 X
Table 2 Financing of Gross Investments, 1970 to 1976
Year
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
Gross
invest-
ments
R million
3730
4257
4048
5065
7064
8397 •
8296
Source of Capital, Per Cent
Private
saving
23,9 Z
27,6 Z
37,1 Z
20,0 Z
19,9 Z
25,5 Z
26,1 Z
Corporate
saving
10,5 Z
10,5 Z
15,6 Z
28,9 Z
22,9 Z
17,5 Z
19,7 Z
Depre-
ciation
29,8 Z
29,7 Z
34,8 Z
31,1 Z
25,3 Z
24,7 Z
29,3 %
Foreign
capital
inflow
15,6 Z
19,2 Z-
11,1 Z
- 1,0 Z
12,9 Z
23,2 Z
12,0 Z
Others
20,2 Z
13,0 %
1,4 Z
21,0 Z
19,0 Z
9,1 Z
12,9 Z
percentaggjraiues^n bracket^
C
C
Year
I 1956
I960
1965
1970
1971
I 1972
1973
1974
1975
1 Great
fcrltaid
H1731
(62)
1815
(60)
2100
(62)
3202
(55)
3696
(53)
4126
(53)
4545
(44)
5062
(40)
6490
(39) |
n
[USA 'I
342
(12)
347
00
454
(13)
" 812
(14)
1033
(15)
1348
(17)
1687
(16)
2429
09)
1 3121
'.<"> 1
i Prance
147
(5)
168
(6) ••
200
(6)
442
(8)
454
(6)
467
(6)
507
(5)
551
(4)
691
(4)
Switzer
land
88
(3)
97
(3)
150
(4)
337
(6)
402
(6)
480
(6)
.572
(6)
683
(5)
939
(6)
—i
Germany i
LI
1 * !
1 * J
f * f
339
(6)
1 382
i (5)
! 4331 (6)
| 500
1 }
1066
[ (8)
1631
1
 do)
— 1
I
Interna-
tional
Organis-
ations
134
(5)
203
(7)
125
(4)
123
(2)
215
(3)
235
(3)
208
(2)
1 205(0
1 230
(1)
— 1
I Others
348
(13)
394
(13)
369
(M)
563
(9)
1 851
i (12)
1
 697
(9)
2361
j (22)
! 2761
(23)
3348
(21)
Total
2790
(100)
3024
(100)
3398 j
(100)
5818
(100)
7033
(100)
7786
(100)
10380
(100)
12757
(100)
16450
(100)
.J
Table 4 Profitability of Foreign Investments in South Africa,
1957 to 1975.
C
Year
1957
I960
1965
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
Dividend
payments
R m
77
79
133
173
155
177
215
174
169
Retained
profits
R m
41
33
94
181
205
249
978
448
238
Nominal
share
capital
R m
422
478
502
705
747
774
758
804
884
Share
capital
plus
reserves
R m
1021
1194
1512
2499
2746
3022
3984
4478
4796
Dividends on
Share
capital
Percent
18,2
16,5
26,5
24,5
20.8
22,9
28,4
2J.6
19,1
Share •
capital
plug.
retained
Percent
7,5
6,6
8,8
6.9
5,6
5.9
5,4
3,9
3.5
Dividends
plus retained
Profits on
Capital and
Reserves
Percent
11,6
9.4
15,0
14,2
13,1
14,1
29,9
13,9
8,5
Table 5 Consequences of a Hypothetical Investment Boycott on Gross Domestic Product/ Employment and Gross Incomes
Assumption: 20% of Long-Term Foreign Investments of 1976 are boycotted.
Economic Sector
Metal Industry
Furniture
Rubber Products
Non-metallic Mineral Products
Iron and Steel Industry
Non-ferrous metal industry
Agricultural machinery
Electrical Machinery
Radio and Television
Motor Vehicle Industry
Railway Equipment
Construction
Total
20% of
Foreign
investments
of 1976
R Million
30
7
8
13
26
10
4
8
11
19
4
59
199
Decrease
in Gross
National
Product
R Million
27
6
6
10
19
8
3
5
8
9
3
51
155
Increase in Unemployment
White
2280
371
344
611
1404
270
704
512
583
722
204
3363
11368
Colour
540
329
112
195
130
50
44
144
176
342
28
1829
3919
Asian
90
98
48
39
52
30
8
24
55
38
8
295
785
Black
4830
689
688
1248
2210
570
380
672
715
855
292
7375
20724
Decrease In Disposable Incomes
White
13,2
2,1
2,0
3,5
8,1
. 1,6
4,1
2,9
3,4.
4,2
1,2
19,5
65,8
:oloured
1,0
0,6
0,2
0,4
0,2
0,1
0,1
0,3
0,3
0,6
0,1
3,4
7,3
Asian
0,21
0,23
0,11
0,09
0,12
0,07
0,01
0,06
0,13
0,09
0,02
0,70
1,84
Blacfc
6,1
1,1
0,9
1,6
2,8
0,7
0,5
0,8
0,9
1,1
0,4
9,3
26,2
Total
20,51
4,03
3,21
5,59
11,22
2,47
4,71
4,06
4,73.
5,99
•%72
32,90
101,14
Table 6 Consequences of a Hypothetical Investment Boycott on Gross Domestic Product, Employment and Gross Incomes
Assumption: 50% of Long-Term Foreign Investments of 1976 are boycotted
Economic Sector
Metal Industry
Furniture
Rubber Products
Non-metallic Mineral Products
Iron and Steel Industry
Non-ferrous metal industry
Agricultural machinery
Electrical Machinery
Radio and Television
Motor Vehicle Industry
Railway Equipment
Construction
Total
50% of
Foreign
Investments
tn. 1976
K Million
74
17
19
33
65
23
B
21
28
48
13
149
496
Decrease
in Gross
National
Product
61 .
14
14
26
48
19
6
14
2 0 •
23
11
130
386
Increase ir
- White i
5624
901
817
1551
3510
621
512
1344
1484
1824
663
8493
27344
Coloured
1332
799
266
495
325
115
88
378
44B
864
91
4619
9820
I Unemployment
Asian
222
238
114
99
130
69
16
63
140
96
26
745
1958
Black
11914
2159
1634
3168
5525
1311
760
1764
1820
2160
949
18625
51789
Decrease in Disposable Incomes
White
32 6
5,2
4,7
9,0
20,4
3,6
3,0
7,8
8 6
10,6
3,8
49,2
158,5
Coloure
2,5
1,5
0,5
0,9
0,6
0,2
0,2
0,7
0,8
1,6
O,2
8,6
18,3
I Asian
0,5
0,6
0,3
O,2
0,3
0,2
-
0,2
0,3
0,2
0,1
1,8
4,7
Black
15,1
2,7
2.1
4,0
7,0
1,7
0,9
2,2
2,3
2,7
1,2
23,6
65,5
Total
50,7
10,0
7,6
14,1
28,3
5,7
4,1
10,9
12,0
15,1
5,3
83,2
"247,0
Table 7 Consequences of a hypothetical Export Boycott on Gross Domestic Product, Employment and Gross Incomes.
Assumption: 20% of 1976 Exports are boycotted. _ _
Economic Sector
Agricultural Products
Gold and Uranium
Other Mining Products
Food, Beverages, Tobacco
Clothing and Textiles
Timber, Paper, Printing
Chemical Products, Rubber, Glass
Metal, Minerals, Iron and Steel
Machines and Transport
Other Industrial Products
Commercial Services
Transport, Storage, Communication
Other Services
Total
* *
20% of
Foreign
Exports
of'1996 RM*
134
548
273
197
45
21
56
77
37
79
73
111
61
1712
Decrease in
Gross
National
Product, RM*
124
498
242
166
32
16
42
60
26
60
70
106
56
1498
Increase in Unemployment
K&tte
7102
21920
9009
10244
1710
1050
2184
4081
2997
5372
6789
9879
7747
90084
Non-White
49312
135904
41769
49644
9450
3171
4760
6699
3182
10507
8906
11211
8784
343299
Decrease in l>I.sposable
Incomes,
White
45,8
162,2
66,2
68,9
10,5
7,1
14,5
28,2
20,6
36r2
35,0
51,5
39,1
585,8
Non-White
68,1
188,9
57,6
69,7 .
13,2 :
4,5
6,8
6,5
4,6
13,5
12,0
14,7
11,3
471,4
V*RM = Million Rand
